A growing literature in macroeconomics and …nance has found important economic e¤ects of variations in risk, in particular shocks to the volatility of key macroeconomic variables (such as total factor productivity). However, much less is known about the importance of shocks to the skewness of macroeconomic variables. 1 In this paper, we seek to quantify the economic e¤ects of skewness shocks. To this end, we augment a small open economy real business cycle model with a novel feature: discrete regime changes in the higherorder moments of exogenous shocks, modeled as shocks to total factor productivity (TFP). We assume that in each period the economy can be in one of two possible Markov states: an unrest state or a quiet state. The unrest state is assumed to be associated with a substantial increase in volatility and negative skewness of shocks. This assumption is motivated by our empirical …ndings about the moments of business cycles of many countries that experience political unrest (see the discussion of our calibration below). Hence, unrest is e¤ectively a shock to the second-order and third-order moments of the distribution of economic shocks.
To solve the model, we develop a third-order perturbation method to approximate the endogenous reactions to shocks to the second-order and third-order moments of TFP. Existing methods to solve and simulate models (including global approximations to policy functions as in Judd [1996] or Richter et al. [2014] or perturbation methods as in Andreasen et al. [2017] ) rely on Monte Carlo simulations to calculate the dynamics of third-order moments of endogenous quantities such as output and consumption. However, Monte Carlo simulations are problematic for the computation of higher-order moments such as skewness because these higher-order moments are more sensitive to simulation error. 2 To overcome this problem, we build upon the method of Andreasen (2017) to calculate generalized impulse response functions (GIRF) of third-order approximations of third-order moments of endogenous variables. Our solution method exploits computational symbolic algebraic manipulation to calculate the third-order moments without Monte Carlo simulations. This technical innovation is nontrivial, since it requires solving for the dynamics of over 20,000 polynomials, in the presence of a Markov-switching state, that are up to ninth order in the state variables. Furthermore, our approach is readily applicable to other DSGE models, especially those for which the dynamics of higher-order moments of endogenous variables are of interest.
Calibration: To calibrate the model, we document and exploit the substantial changes in higher-order moments of aggregate economic variables during periods of mass political unrest. Unrest episodes, which are well-documented by the political science literature (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013) , are helpful in identifying higher-order moment shocks for several reasons. First, we …nd that these episodes are associated with substantial increases in the volatility and negative skewness of growth rates of output, consumption, and investment. For instance, on average, a year during an unrest episode is associated with a more than 50 percent increase in the volatility and a more than three times increase in the negative skewness of output growth. The changes in higher-order moments of aggregate variables (output growth, consumption growth, and investment growth) associated with an episode of unrest can be estimated with reasonable precision, since the database provides a relatively large number of country-year observations (with 2 The calculation of skewness and other higher-order moments is sensitive to the tails of the distribution of interest. Since realizations on the tails are rare, many Monte Carlo draws are needed to ensure that the tails are su¢ ciently sampled. Therefore, for a given simulation length, the in ‡uence of Monte Carlo simulation error is going to be much more pernicious for higher-order moments, such as skewness, than for lower-order moments, such as the mean.
eighty-four unrest episodes between 1960 and 2006, each lasting more than …ve years on average).
Second, since the model assumes that shocks are common knowledge, we ideally want to identify shocks using events that are easily observed for all agents, at home or abroad. Mass unrest episodes are appropriate for this end, as they are major events, and agents in the economy as well as investors abroad do not need to be econometricians to learn that a campaign of mass political unrest is underway. Hence, the onset of an unrest episode is likely to have a direct e¤ect on economic agents' perceptions of risk. Furthermore, since the impulse response exercises assume unanticipated shocks, we ideally want to use events that are ex-ante di¢ cult to predict. Unrest episodes are again appropriate for this end, as it has been well-documented that mass unrest is largely unanticipated because it requires unpredictable shocks that enable a large number of nonstate actors to overcome informational and coordination problems. 3 Results: Our model shows that the increase in volatility and especially negative skewness when the economy enters an episode of unrest has quantitatively substantial impacts on economic activities. In the baseline calibration, the observed changes in volatility and negative skewness can explain 21 percent of the observed drop in average output growth, 45 percent of the drop in average consumption growth, and 51 percent of the drop in average investment growth during unrest episodes. More importantly, the increase in negative skewness accounts for about half of these drops in growth.
Intuitively, when shocks become more negatively skewed, risk-averse agents know that realizations on the left tail of the distribution of shocks have become more likely. The increase causes agents to shift their portfolios to safer assets abroad and accumulate stocks of these safer assets, leading to capital out ‡ow and drops in domestic investment and output. The consequences of this increased mass on the left tail are heightened under Epstein-Zin preferences. A Taylor expansion of the household's Bellman equation reveals that Epstein-Zin preferences punish and reward, respectively, the second and third central moments of the future value function. To a second-order approximation, EpsteinZin preferences penalize the second central moment, i.e., variance. To a third-order approximation, the preferences gain an additional term that rewards the third central moment, which is the product of skewness and variance raised to the power of 3/2. Therefore, the quantitative e¤ects of time-varying variance is ampli…ed by time-varying negative skewness.
We demonstrate the quantitative signi…cance of skewness by comparing the losses in economic activities during unrest under a secondorder approximation to the same losses under a third-order approximation. The second-order approximation can account for only half of the economic losses that the third-order approximation can. Therefore, negative skewness is revealed as an important component of risk.
Related literature. Our paper is related to several strands of the literature on higher-order moments of business cycles. First, there is a growing body of research that emphasizes the importance of the timevarying volatilities of economic variables (e.g., Justiniano and Primiceri 2008; Caldara et al. 2012; Arellano et al. 2012; Christiano et al. 2014; and Gilchrist et al. 2014 . The study that is the closest to ours in quantifying the impact of time-varying higher-order moments is Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011) . They consider a stochastic volatility process for the real interest rate and explore the impacts of interest rate volatility shocks to economic activities. The primary di¤erence between our paper and this literature is that while they focus only on shocks to second moments, we focus on shocks to both second-order and third-order moments.
Second, there is a related body of macro-…nance research that stresses the importance of skewness (e.g., Rancière et al. 2008; Barberis and Huang 2008; Guvenen et al. 2014; Salgado et al. 2015; Feunou et al. 2015; and Colacito et al. 2015) . Our analysis is most related and complementary to that of Colacito et al. (2015) , who show the importance of time-varying skewness in a macro-…nance model with Epstein-Zin preferences. The major di¤erence is that while they focus on the e¤ects of skewness on …nancial variables (implied equity Sharpe ratios and equity risk premia), we focus on the e¤ects on real economic variables (the growth rates of output, consumption, and investment). Also, while they focus on the United States, we focus on emerging and developing economies. Finally, while they calibrate the model by looking at analysts'forecasts for the U.S. economy, we look at the changes in higher-order moments of real economic variables during unrest episodes.
Finally, our paper is also related to a body of literature that emphasizes the importance of rare disasters in explaining macroeconomic phenomena (e.g., Barro 2006; Gourio 2012; Andreasen 2012; Gabaix 2012) . A key insight from this literature is that variations in the probability of rare disasters, modeled as events on the far left tail of the distribution of shocks, can have …rst-order macroeconomic e¤ects, as they in ‡uence the precautionary behaviors of risk-averse agents. Our paper points out that time-varying negative skewness has similar effects. This is because an increase in negative skewness implies a higher probability of states with very low consumption. However, our estimation approach is di¤erent and complementary to existing approaches in this literature. Since rare disasters occur infrequently in data, the literature usually does not estimate the time variation in the probability of disasters from data, 4 or it employs calibrations to proxies such as time-varying volatility of equity returns (e.g., Gourio et al. 2013) . In contrast, we exploit the uncertainty associated with episodes of unrest to estimate the time variation in the skewness of economic shocks when the economies enter and exit unrest. 5 Our paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes our data sources and documents several stylized facts on business cycles during unrest episodes. Section 2 introduces unrest to a standard small open economy model and calculates how much of the stylized facts can be explained by changes in the distribution of shocks. Section 3 concludes.
DATA AND STYLIZED FACTS Data Sources and De nitions
For economics and other data, we use annual panel macroeconomic data from 154 countries listed in the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) database over the interval . This includes three time series: real output, real investment, and real consumption. We also use WDI data on the Gini coe¢ cient and Alesina et al.'s (2003) data on ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization as control variables For mass unrest episodes, we use the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset, version 2.0 (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013) . NAVCO 2.0 provides a "consensus population" of all known continuous and large (having at least 1,000 observed participants) organized unrest campaigns between 1945 and 2006 6 that satisfy a series of conditions, as detailed in Appendix C. Each episode has an onset year and an end year. The onset year is de…ned as the …rst year with a series of coordinated, contentious collective actions with at least 1,000 observed participants. The episode is recorded as over when peak
Figure 1 Example of Business Cycles Around Unrest
Notes: Growth rates of output, consumption, and investment (dY, dC, and dI respectively) of the Philippines around the People's Power Revolution (1983-87). participation drops below 1,000. Overall, the NAVCO dataset provides 157 episodes of nonviolent and violent mass political unrest around the world between 1945 and 2006. Of these, there are eighty-four episodes in the years between 1960 and 2006, the period for which we have both unrest and economic data. Over this period, the average duration of an episode is 5.99 years.
Examples include many pro-democracy movements of civil unrest in Latin America, the Philippines's People Power Revolution (1983-87), Indonesia's civil unrest against Suharto (1997-98) , and Mozambique's RENAMO resistance movement (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) ; for a complete listing of these episodes, see Appendix A.1. As an illustration, Figure 1 plots the time series of the growth rate in aggregate economic variables for the Philippines around the People's Power Revolution.
Stylized Facts on Business Cycles During Unrest
We now investigate the relationship between unrest and macroeconomic activities. The goal of this section is to arrive at a set of moments that will be used as calibration targets for the structural model of the following section. We focus on the contemporaneous association between unrest in a given country-year and the growth rates of output, consumption, and investment. We follow others in the macroeconomic literature (e.g., Fernández-Villaverde et al. 2011) and do not explicitly model why the higher-order moments change, nor do we attempt to make any causal claims about the contemporaneous causal impacts of unrest on output or vice versa.
We calculate the growth rates of output, consumption, and investment by the …rst di¤erence in logs of the variable at constant 2005 USD and then remove a country-speci…c average growth rate from each series. That is, if the real output for country i in year t is Y it , then we calculate the raw growth rate as Y it 100(ln Y it ln Y it 1 ). Then we take out the country's average growth rate to yield a demeaned output growth rate of
A similar method is applied to demean consumption and investment growth. We demean to isolate ‡uctuations at the business cycle frequency and to control for di¤erences in country-speci…c average growth rates.
We then contrast the distributions of growth rates during unrest (g it jU it = 1) against moments during quiet times of no unrest (g it jU it = 0) in Figure 2 . The left column of Figure 2 displays smoothed kernel estimates of the empirical probability density functions for the growth rates of output, consumption, and investment, and the right column displays the corresponding empirical cumulative distribution functions. The probability density functions are estimated by Epanechnikov kernels with a bandwidth of 2 percentage points for output and consumption, and 4 percentage points for investment. The …gures suggest that the distributions of the growth rates are more negatively skewed during unrest episodes.
To have numerical comparisons, Table 1 displays the means, standard deviations, skewnesses, and kurtoses of (country-demeaned) output growth, consumption growth, and investment growth during and outside of unrest episodes. All con…dence intervals are bootstrapped with 500 replications and are reported at the 95 percent level. The …rst two columns report the estimated moments. The third column reports the di¤erence in the estimated moments, along with the p-value for a test of the null hypothesis that there is no di¤erence between the corresponding moments. The fourth column reports the ratio of the estimated standard deviations, along with the p-value for the Levene test of the equality of variances. The …fth column reports the p-value for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of whether the two distributions of shocks (under unrest and no unrest) are the same. Table 1 shows that a period of unrest is associated with signi…-cant losses in growth. The per-year loss in output growth (relative to periods without unrest) is 1.92 percent, statistically signi…cant at the 1 percent level. This estimated per-year loss is nontrivial, especially given that unrest is persistent once started. The estimated cumulative loss is relatively substantial at 11.50 percent of the base (pre-onset) year's output. 7 The annual loss in consumption growth is 1.22 percent, which is smaller than that of output growth. At the same time, investment growth losses are larger than output growth, at 3.96 percent. In cumulative terms, consumption and investment losses amount to 7.31 percent and 23.71 percent, respectively. Note that this ordering of the loss in investment, output, and consumption is consistent with the permanent income hypothesis, which predicts that investment is more sensitive to shocks than output, which is in turn more sensitive than consumption.
Furthermore, Table 1 shows that the standard deviations of the growth rates of output, consumption, and investment substantially increase during unrest episodes. The fourth column of Table 1 displays the ratio of standard deviations. We can see that the standard deviation of output growth is 53 percent larger in unrest, and the standard deviations of consumption and investment growth are 17 percent and 35 percent larger, respectively. The column also reports the p-values of Levene's test of equality of variances between various forms of unrest against the baseline of no unrest. The p-values show that all of these increases are highly statistically signi…cant: well below 0.01 for all three.
Table 1 also shows that both output and consumption growth becomes more negatively skewed during unrest. The di¤erence in the skewness between unrest and no unrest is 1:57 for output growth and 3:36 for consumption growth. The bootstrapped p-value for the hypothesis that the di¤erence in skewness is equal to zero is 0.15 for output growth and 0.10 for consumption growth. While it is generally di¢ cult to estimate higher-order moments of relatively infrequent events with great con…dence, we believe that these di¤erences in skewness are economically signi…cant. The greater variance and larger left tail of many distributions are also visually discernible in Figure 2 . 8 This discernible mass on the left tail corresponds to a continuous range from moderately to extremely bad outcomes. The di¤erence between a period of unrest and a period with no unrest then is not the increased probability of a single disaster but an increase in the probability of a whole range of bad outcomes. 7 If p is the continuation probability and x is the annual loss, then the cumulative loss is estimated to be
While there is also a visibly larger left tail for the distribution of investment growth, the bootstrapped di¤erence in the skewness in investment growth between unrest and no unrest is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, with a p-value of 0:83. This is because there are a few observations of investment growth that are very large in absolute value on both sides of the distribution (consistent with sharp falls in investment and subsequent rebounds), and the bootstrapped estimate of the di¤erence in skewness is sensitive to these outliers.
Finally, as the …fth column of Table 1 shows, under the KolmogorovSmirnov test, we can reject the hypothesis that the two distributions of shocks (under unrest and under no unrest) are the same, as the associated p-value is zero for each series (output growth, consumption growth, or investment growth).
We summarize our results in the following stylized fact: Fact: Episodes of mass political unrest are associated with statistically and economically signi…cant economic costs: the distributions of output, investment, and consumption growth during unrest have lower means and higher variances than the distributions in periods of no unrest. In addition, the distributions of output and consumption growth are more negatively skewed during unrest.
One potential mechanism that could explain the increased volatility and negative skewness in economic activities is that unrest is associated with substantial increases in the probability of institutional disruptions. In Appendix A.3, we document that the probabilities of large political and government changes, including major changes in polity and coups, substantially increase during unrest episodes. Large political changes are often associated with signi…cant changes in legal and economic institutions, such as the protection of property and investment, which are key determinants of investment and growth (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; and Acemoglu et al. 2014) . Therefore, unrest episodes can increase the probability and severity of economic disasters.
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS Model
How much of observed declines in average output, consumption, and investment growth during unrest, as reported in the previous section, can be attributed to volatility and skewness shocks? To answer this question, we augment a standard small open economy with a regimeswitching process for the volatility and skewness of TFP. We calibrate the regime-switching process to moments that were estimated from data in the previous section.
Consider a canonical small open economy model with a representative household. Domestic …rms competitively produce a numeraire good Y t using capital K t 1 and labor H t , subject to TFP t :
These …rms take factor prices R t and W t as given. Their …rst-order conditions on their optimal choices of capital and labor equate these factor prices with the corresponding marginal products in production:
Unrest shock. We introduce a regime-switching process. Let u t be an exogenous two-state Markov process, with u t = 1 representing the country being in unrest in period t and u t = 0 representing no unrest, or a quiet time, in period t. Transitional probabilities are calibrated to match the probability of unrest onset and the persistence of unrest observed in data.
To model how unrest a¤ects economic activities in the most tractable way, we assume that unrest a¤ects the TFP process. Intuitively, as unrest episodes are associated with signi…cant economic and political instability, they will a¤ect the productivity of many economic sectors by, for instance, a¤ecting the e¢ ciency of resource allocation (Acemoglu et al. 2014) . Such e¤ects can be captured in a reduced form by a wedge to TFP, as in Chari et al. (2007) .
Remark. Recall that our goal is to analyze the extent to which the shocks to higher-order moments of aggregate macroeconomic variables that we observe during unrest can explain the observed average losses in output, consumption, and investment growth. To conduct this analysis in the simplest and clearest possible way, we assume that unrest is a shock only to higher-order moments of the TFP process and not to the …rst moment. Obviously, this is a simplifying assumption and will likely lead to underestimations of the economic impacts of unrest. The model can be extended to allow for the possibility that unrest a¤ects the …rst moment as well, but this will complicate the analysis. We will show that, even without an immediate associated fall in average productivity, a higher-order moment shock is enough to generate large changes in macroeconomic aggregates in line with the data.
Speci…cally, assume that TFP t consists of a growth component (g t ) 1 and a level component A t :
where, for numerical simplicity, we have assumed that growth rate is a constant g. However, level component A t follows an autoregressive process with autoregressive parameter and i.i.d. shocks " t :
The stochastic process for " t depends on whether the economy is currently experiencing unrest. While in unrest (u t = 1), shock " t is distributed Normal Inverse Gaussian with mean 0, standard deviation u , skewness s u , and kurtosis u . While not in unrest (u t = 0), shock " t is distributed Normal Inverse Gaussian with mean 0, standard devia-tion q , skewness s q , and kurtosis q . The Normal Inverse Gaussian distribution has been used in the …nance literature to model skewed distributions with fat tails (e.g. Barndor¤-Nielsen 1997; Andersson 2001; and Mencía and Sentana 2012) . The fact that the mean of " t is the same whether u t = 0 or u t = 1 re ‡ects the assumption that unrest only a¤ects higher-order moments of TFP. 9 Preferences: As is now standard in the macro-…nance literature (e.g., Gourio 2012; and Colacito and Croce 2013), we assume the representative household has recursive preferences as in Epstein and Zin (1989) . These preferences allow us to distinguish between the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and risk aversion (captured by and below). Moreover, these preferences nest the standard expected utility with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) as a special case.
Let C t denote household consumption in period t, and letC t C t ! 1 g t 1 H ! t denote labor-adjusted consumption, where and ! are preference parameters. Then, we follow the sign convention of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) and de…ne the representative household's preferences as:
(1) This convention ensures that the value function and the instantaneous payo¤ have the same sign.
Households supply capital and labor to the domestic …rms, consume domestic goods, invest subject to an adjustment cost in capital, and trade noncontingent bonds in the international credit market:
Ct;Dt;It;HtṼ t ; subject to:
We assume that the interest rate households borrow at is a function of the aggregate stock of debt D t :
where r t is the interest rate, r is a constant representing the world's risk-free interest rate, and d and are exogenous constants. This debt-elastic interest rate is a standard assumption to ensure that the equilibrium is stationary (e.g., Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2003).
Finally, a recursive equilibrium is de…ned as a set of policy functions for C t , V t , K t , D t , Y t , r t , I t , H t , W t , and R t as functions of K t 1 , D t 1 , A t , and u t such that all agent expectations are rational and the optimality conditions, constraints, and laws of motion described above hold.
Solution Method
One way to derive moments of output, consumption, and investment growth from the model is to simulate a very long time series in which the country transitions into and out of unrest with the same probabilities as in the data. But since unrest is rare, we would need an extraordinarily long simulated time series to reduce the Monte Carlo noise around our estimates of those higher-order moments. Instead, we adapt the pruning method from Andreasen et al. (2017) to get closed-form solutions for the paths of conditional moments of endogenous variables, the GIRF. We …rst describe how we calculate a GIRF and then how we use the GIRF to compare the model against the data. All details on the computational strategy, from approximation to pruning and the GIRF, are given in the Appendix.
We de…ne the GIRF as follows. Let y t denote the log-deviation of output Y t from its steady-state value. Then y t is the growth rate of output Y t . Let X t denote a vector of the …rst three powers of the growth rates of output, consumption, and investment:
The GIRF is the evolution over time of the di¤erence of conditional expectations of X t between two conditioning sets, di¤ering with respect to two given time series of realizations of unrest, u = fu t ; 1 < t < 1g andũ = fũ t ; 1 < t < 1g:
The …rst path, u, represents a country that starts with no unrest and then enters into unrest at t = 1 and stays there. That is, u t = 0 8t 0 and u t = 1 8t 1. The second counterfactual path,ũ, is one where the country never enters unrest:ũ t = 0 8t.
Remark. The GIRF is useful for our purposes for several reasons. First, we want to calculate the moments that would be uncovered from a simulation. The conditional expectations in the GIRF allow us to consider the e¤ects of shocks over the course of the GIRF. This is important, since under a nonlinear approximation to the policy function, the presence of shocks will cause the ergodic moments of all variables to di¤er from those in the absence of shocks. Second, since X t contains powers and products of endogenous variables, we can …nd paths not just for conditional means, but also for conditional variances and skewnesses of the endogenous variables of interest given the paths for the components of X t . Moreover, the GIRF allows us to avoid measurement error, which is a problem for estimating higher-order moments of simulated series from a …nite simulation length. While Andreasen et al. (2017) rely on SMM for higher-order moments, we use the computer algebra software Mathematica to calculate GIRFs for these moments symbolically, term by term, and avoid Monte Carlo error.
The GIRF provides the conditional moments in the …rst year of an unrest episode, the second year, and so on. The moments from the data presented in the previous section are weighted averages over the years in observed unrest episodes because years that are closer to the beginning of an episode are more likely observed than years that are many years after the beginning of an episode. If p = Pr(U t jU t 1 = 1), then the probability of a given observed year of unrest being the nth year of unrest (n 1) within its respective episode is (1 p)p n 1 . Thus, to construct the single value for average value of X on unrest, we take a weighted average of a GIRF where a country enters into unrest and stays there but with smaller and smaller weight given to later periods of unrest. That is, we calculate
Calibrations First, we calibrate the model's basic parameters using standard values from the small open economy literature. These numbers are listed in the top panel of Table 2 . 10 We allow the values for Epstein-Zin preference parameters to vary within the standard range of values of the literature, surveyed in Table 3 . 11
Second, we calibrate parameters for the unrest process and the higher-order moments of TFP innovation " t to estimated moments from our empirical analysis in Section 1. Care must be paid to the calibration of the higher-order moments of TFP, both in unrest and in quiet times. The parameters chosen in the model govern the exogenous TFP process, but they are chosen to match the moments of endogenous quantities. It is relatively straightforward (as one could even rely on closed-form solutions) to choose the volatility of a shock process given a desired volatility of an endogenous quantity, such as output growth under a log-linear approximation to equilibrium. However, it is much less straightforward to choose higher-order moments of a shock process to match higher-order moments of a nonlinear approximation of the law of motion for an endogenous variable. Therefore, the parameters q , u , s q , and s u are chosen so that the ergodic standard deviation and skewness of output growth, and the average generalized impulse responses of the standard deviation and skewness of output growth, match those in the data. 12 
Results
Model's performance relative to data. We compare the average loss in output, investment, and consumption growth from the GIRF P 1 t=1 (1 p)p t 1 GIRF u ( y t ) to the corresponding observed average loss in growth as documented in Section 1. Table 4 reports the percentage of observed growth loss that can be explained by the calibrated model. The overall e¤ect is an endogenous response of endogenous variables to an unrest shock that increases the volatility and negative skewness of TFP shocks, with an interplay of capital adjustment costs and preferences over the time resolution of risk. In each panel, we report the percentage obtained by using the …rst-, second-, and third-order approximations of the solution to the model. Note that by construction, the percentage explained using a …rst-order approximation is zero, as we assume that unrest does not a¤ect the …rst moment of TFP shocks. The columns report the results with di¤erent preference parameters. Table 4 shows that, under the baseline speci…cation (the …rst column), the model explains 21 percent of the average output growth loss, 45 percent of the average consumption growth loss, and 51 percent of the average investment growth loss. This amounts to an output growth Table 4 shows that, not surprisingly, the model can explain more with a larger coe¢ cient of risk aversion ( = 20 instead of = 10). There, the fractions of growth losses explained increase to 62 percent for output, 128 percent for consumption and 148 percent for investment (thus this calibration "overexplains" the losses in consumption and investment). On the other hand, when we shut down Epstein-Zin preferences and use a lower coe¢ cient of risk aversion (the third column), the fractions of growth losses explained decrease to 9 percent, 11 percent, and 23 percent for output, consumption, and investment, respectively.
It is not surprising that the model cannot fully explain the observed losses, since we assume that unrest only a¤ects higher-order moments of TFP shocks, and not the …rst-order moment, thus abstracting away from factors such as reallocation of resources between sectors of the economy that may directly a¤ect the average productivity. 13 However, the table shows that shocks to the higher-order moments of TFP alone can still explain a substantial fraction of the observed losses, especially in investment. Even without Epstein-Zin preferences and with a relatively low risk-aversion index, the model can still explain around a fourth of the observed loss in investment growth. Intuitively, in the model, when risk increases (either through the second-order or third-order moment of TFP), agents in the country shift away from domestic capital and into the internationally traded asset. This mechanism explains the drop in investment.
Role of negative skewness. One of our main …ndings is that negative skewness shocks play quantitatively important roles in driving business cycles. To see this, in rows labeled "second order"in Table 4 , we show the fractions of observed losses explained under each calibration, but using an approximation of the solution of the model only to the second order, and thus e¤ectively shutting down the endogenous response to the shock to the skewness of TFP. As the baseline column shows, the reaction to skewness is substantial : the fractions of average losses explained in the third-order rows are roughly doubling those explained in the second-order rows. Di¤erences of comparable magnitudes are also found in the two other calibration columns.
Why does skewness matter? Intuitively, agents in our model dislike negative skewness. To see this, letC t = C t ! 1 g t 1 H ! t , the aggregate of utility from consumption and labor to the household. By the de…nition of household preferences, V
so that when = & and thus Epstein-Zin preferences reduce to expected utility preferences, v t is the usual de…ni-tion of the value function for the household:
. The third-order Taylor approximation for v t around 1 3 For example, if sectors of the economy di¤er not only with respect to average productivity, but also exposure to political uncertainty under unrest, we might see a reallocation of capital to relatively ine¢ cient sectors, driving up the share of output growth loss explained. Recent work by Acemoglu et al. (2014) provides evidence that, during the Egyptian experience of the Arab Spring, …rms that had closer ties to the threatened regime su¤ered greater losses on the Egyptian stock market than …rms that did not. Exploring the macroeconomic signi…cance of this and other micro risks associated with political unrest would be complementary to our analysis and is outside of the scope of this paper.
The …rst three terms of the continuation payo¤ are well-known in the literature on Epstein-Zin preferences (e.g., . The …rst term is current utility. The second is the same discounted continuation payo¤ that appears in non-Epstein-Zin expected utility preferences. The third term is a "correction" to expected utility that penalizes future variance of the value function as long as > &. 14 The fourth term is novel to a third-order approximation. Under the same assumption that > & and & < 1, this term rewards positive skewness of the future value function and penalizes negative skewness. As increases, the penalties for both volatility and negative skewness increase.
The term
, the third central moment of the value function. It shows that, for a given amount of skewness, the size of the third central moment increases in the variance. This is why skewness and variance are complementary in giving rise to precautionary motives in equilibrium.
Expression (2) is another way to see how these higher-order moments relate to a disaster risk. A disaster is an outcome on the far left tail. If variance increases, extreme events on both tails become more likely. If in addition skewness becomes more negative, the events far out on the lower tail speci…cally become more likely. Though we do not calculate a fourth-order approximation to this model, one can easily show that the next term in the above expansion would penalize the fourth central moment of the value function. An increase in the fourth-order moment, like an increase in negative skewness for a given second-order moment, also makes outcomes on the tails more likely. Therefore, by taking a higher-order approximation to the value function and by considering shock distributions with fat and skewed tails, we can recover some of the e¤ects of what has been explored in the rare disaster literature.
Comparison with other studies. How do the results in Table 4 compare with other studies in the literature on the macroeconomic e¤ects of risk? It is well-known that increases in second-order moments lead to economic slowdowns, though the range of models in the literature is wide and none are exactly comparable with the model in this paper in terms of modeling assumptions or forcing processes. For example, while using a very di¤erent model (a closed economy with heterogeneous …rms, subject to a transitory shock to the second-order moment of a composite of technology and demand, on the monthly frequency), Bloom (2009) Gourio's (2012) experiment with a transitory increase in the disaster probability, in our model, investment experiences the most signi…cant decline and output contracts by a few percentage points. However, in that model, a disaster also entails some destruction of capital, so it is di¢ cult to directly compare the two sets of numerical results.
Welfare. Finally, we evaluate the welfare loss due to the shock to the distribution of TFP. The change in the value function V t experienced in the …rst period of an unrest episode corresponds to the welfare loss from facing the more negatively skewed distribution of TFP. The loss can be evaluated by considering the following counterfactual scenario: suppose that household consumption is dictated by a social planner who ensures that households enjoy labor-adjusted consumption C (the steady-state level of labor-adjusted consumption in the model) during each period the economy is not in unrest and C C , where C < 1, during each period the economy is in unrest. Suppose additionally that unrest follows the same stochastic switching process as in the data and the model but there are no other sources of uncertainty to the households. The value function of the household in this scenario takes on two values: V while not in unrest, and V V , where V < 1, while in unrest. The value function takes the following form:
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The log-linearization of the above:
For a given d V , we can calculate the change in labor-adjusted consumption d C that would give rise to a fall of d V in the value function below its steady-state value for each period spent in unrest. We take d V as calculated from our GIRF.
Our estimates imply a d C equal to -6.1 percent. In other words, the welfare loss due to increased volatility and skewness during unrest is equal to the welfare loss if consumption were 6.1 percent lower than its steady-state value in each period of unrest. How does this number compare with those in other studies? Lucas (1987) shows that eliminating all business cycle ‡uctuations for a representative agent with expected-utility preferences corresponds to 0.1 percent to 0.5 percent of steady-state consumption. Dolmas (1998) …nds that the same exercise under Epstein-Zin preferences yields 2 percent to 20 percent of steady-state consumption, depending on the degree of risk aversion.
CONCLUSION
We estimate shocks to the volatility and skewness of business cycles by exploiting the uncertainty associated with episodes of political unrest. A small open economy real business cycle model calibrated to the estimated moments from data shows that higher-order moment shocks, especially increased negative skewness, play important roles in explaining the observed average decline in economic activities. In short, the paper demonstrates the quantitative importance of time-varying skewness of shocks in the context of a small open economy real business cycle model. Our paper makes several contributions to di¤erent threads of the macroeconomic literature. In the context of real business cycle and DSGE models, the mapping from the higher-order moments of exogenous processes to moments of endogenous variables, such as the mapping studied in this paper, is relatively underexplored. While the literature has deployed a number of mechanisms (e.g., adjustment costs on investment, debt-elastic interest rates, habit in consumption, and interest rate smoothing; see Smets and Wouters 2007) to help log-linearized models better replicate the …rst-order and second-order moments of observed time series, it is less clear how these mechanisms a¤ect the model's ability to match third-order moments as well. Our paper suggests it may be important to know more about the endogenous mechanisms that help or hinder matching higher-order moments of models, given that these moments could be important for the consequences of aggregate risk. Additionally, our method of accurately cal-culating the GIRF of third-order moments may help future researchers analyze the dynamics of higher-order moments of macroeconomic aggregates in DSGE models while avoiding Monte Carlo error.
APPENDIX: A. ONLINE APPENDIX: DATA
A.1 Details of NAVCO Unrest Data NAVCO provides detailed information on 250 nonviolent and violent mass political campaigns between 1945 and 2006. These campaigns constitute a "consensus population" of all known cases satisfying the following conditions. Each episode is a series of observable (i.e., tactics used are overt and documented), continuous (distinguishing from one-o¤ events or revolts) mass tactics or events that mobilize nonstate actors in pursuit of a political objective. The NAVCO dataset also provides, among other information, the country, the main participating groups, the documented objective of the movement in each year of the campaign, the presence of violence in each year of the campaign, and the degree to which the movement was successful at achieving the documented objective. We focus on episodes whose objectives belong to one of the following categories:
(0) Regime change indicates a goal of "overthrowing the state or substantially altering state institutions to the point that it would cause a de facto shift in the regime's hold on power."
(1) Signi…cant institution reform indicates a goal of "changing fundamental political structures to alleviate injustices or grant additional rights."
(2) Policy change indicates a goal of "changes in government policy that fall short of changes in the fundamental political structures, including changes in a state's foreign policy."
For a complete listing of NAVCO unrest episodes, see the Online Appendix C.
A.2 Estimates of Onset and Continuation Probabilities
We investigate how likely unrest is to start and how persistent it is once it starts. We establish that unrest is rare but persistent. These facts are important for understanding the economic consequences of higher-order shocks to business cycles.
Let a dummy variable U it take the value of one during episodes of unrest and zero during years with no unrest, where i denotes a country and t denotes a year. We estimate both the probability of unrest onset (i.e., the probability of unrest conditional on no unrest the previous year) and the probability of unrest continuation (i.e., the probability of unrest conditional on there being unrest in the previous year). To assess whether the probability of unrest is a function of other observable characteristics of a country, we estimate two probit models, one for onset and one for continuation. Each probit predicts U it = 1 as a function of a constant and a vector Z it of control variables, including lagged real GDP growth minus the country-speci…c average growth rate
, religious, ethnic, and linguistic fractionalization (all on a scale of 0 to 1), and income inequality (measured with the Gini coe¢ cient). To control for region-speci…c factors that might in ‡u-ence the overall probability of a given country experiencing unrest, we include a term Region(i) as a region-…xed e¤ect. 15 We do not include country-…xed e¤ects because this would e¤ectively exclude any country from our sample that has never experienced unrest. Instead, we want to include all countries in our sample to exploit not just variation within countries but between them as well. The fact that many countries never experience unrest is informative to estimating the probability of onset. The two probit regressions are:
where is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Our baseline estimations, reported in Table 5 , indicate that the onset of unrest is rare: the estimated onset probability is 1.4 percent per year. However, once it starts, unrest tends to last for several years: the estimated continuation probability in Table 6 is 83.3 percent per year. This continuation probability implies that the average duration of unrest episodes is 5:99 (= 1 1 0:833 ). In summary, we …nd that the onset of unrest is rare. But once started, unrest is persistent, leading to relatively lengthy episodes.
A.3 Political Risks Associated with Unrest
We document that the probability of large political changes increases signi…cantly in each year of unrest. To the extent that any large po- Notes: Probit coe¢ cient estimates to predict onset of unrest, Uit, and derived probabilities. Yit denotes real GDP growth (= 100 x (ln Yt ln Yt 1)). Standard errors in parentheses. East Asia is the baseline region for the speci…cation with region FE. *: p < 0:10. **: p < 0:05. ***: p < 0:01.
litical change entails at least a temporary disruption of the economy, an increase in the probability of disruptive events might help make sense of the increase in the left tail of the distributions of output and consumption growth documented in the next section. We estimate a series of probit regressions to predict a set of political disruptions: (1) coups, (2) positive changes in the Polity index, (3) negative changes in the Polity index, (4) large positive changes in the Polity index (greater than …ve points), and (5) large negative changes in the Polity index Notes: Probit coe¢ cient estimates to predict onset of unrest, Uit, and derived probabilities. Yit denotes real GDP growth (= 100 x (ln Yt ln Yt 1)). Standard errors in parentheses. East Asia is the baseline region for the speci…cation with region FE. *: p < 0:10. **: p < 0:05. ***: p < 0:01.
(greater than …ve points). 16 Each probit regression is speci…ed as in equation (6), as a function of a constant, an indicator for current unrest, the di¤erence between lagged real GDP growth and a country-speci…c average real GDP growth, and the interaction between current unrest and lagged real GDP growth. Let X it be an indicator for one of the political disruptions. We estimate: There are a few di¤erences between this speci…cation and the speci…cation of unrest onset and continuation in equation (6). First, we estimate one probit for each political disruption X it . Second, in equation (6), we estimate the probits conditional on the presence of lagged unrest and the absence of lagged unrest separately. Here, we estimate one probit including both unrest and its interactions with the controls in one step. We do this to test hypotheses that the probability of each political disruption is signi…cantly di¤erent in the presence and absence of unrest. Third, for simplicity, we include in the vector of controls Z it just one control: the di¤erence between lagged output growth and country-speci…c average output growth. We …nd that unrest is associated with increases in the probability of all kinds of political changes.
APPENDIX: B. ONLINE APPENDIX: MODEL DETAILS B.1 Derivation of the Household Problem
First, we pose the problem in recursive form
The associated …rst-order conditions and envelope condition are:
These lead to:
B.2 Full Set of Equilibrium Conditions
The equilibrium conditions are (with additional variables introduced for convenience):
(13)
The equilibrium conditions, scaled (c t = C t =Z t 1 ,c t =C t =Z t 1 , 
Steady state at = 0:
B.3 Notes on Solution Method and GIRFs
To approximate the solution to equilibrium of our model, we use a higher-order perturbation method with the pruning algorithm of Andreasen et al. (2017) . Because we calculate GIRFs for higher-order moments of endogenous variables, deriving analytic representations for the GIRFs, as Andreasen et al. (2017) do, would be extremely algebraically tedious. Instead, we rely on the computer algebra software Mathematica to compute these higher-order moments. This section describes our computational strategy. The equilibrium conditions can be stated in the following form:
The vector of equations F includes all optimality conditions, constraints, and the law of motion for the exogenous process. The vector y t is the vector of control variables: [log(y t ); log(c t ); log(i t ); log(h t ); log(r k;t ); log(w t ); log(r t ); log(c t ); t ; log(v t ); log(ṽ t )]. The perturbation parameter, , is 1 in the model of interest but set to 0 at the point of approximation. The vector x t is the vector of continuous states, including the perturbation parameter 17 : [log(k t 1 ); d t 1 ; log(a t ); ]. u t is the indicator for unrest, which can only take the values 0 and 1.
The solution to this model is a set of policy functions of the following form, where t+1 = u t+1 q t+1
and the two shocks u t+1 and q t+1
follow two i.i.d. Normal Inverse Gaussian processes, described in the text:
y t = g(x t ; u t ) (53) x t+1 = h(x t ; u t ) + S(u t+1 ) t+1 :
More speci…cally, for the state vector, 2 6 6 4 log(k t ) d t log(a t+1 ) :
(55) At the point of approximation, the system is at a nonstochastic steady state in x t and y t : x t = x ss = [log(k ss ); d ss ; 0; 0] and y t = y ss . Since the unrest and no-unrest states are completely symmetric at = 0 by construction, the process u t is irrelevant for the steady states of x t and y t . Therefore, the following is true for all values of u t+1 and u t :
In this paper. we are interested in the growth rates of the controls. 
To calculate the average change in the …rst three moments of output, investment, and consumption growth during unrest, we use the concept of GIRF from Andreasen et al. (2017) and Koop et al. (1996) . In particular, we calculate the unconditional moments of all endogenous variables for two …xed paths for the unrest process. The …rst path is for a country that starts with no unrest and then enters into unrest at t = 1 and stays there. That is, u t = 0 8t 0 and u t = 1 8t 1. Denote this path for u t as u. The second counterfactual path is one where the country never enters unrest: u t = 0 8t. Denote this path for u t asũ. Andreasen et al. (2017) condition on an initial value of the state vector z 0 . We instead focus on an unconditional expectation over the entire range of t to be able to arrive at a single path of moments for our exercise. The generalized IRF for the state variables z t is the di¤erence, at each point in time t, of the unconditional mean of z t along the path u and the unconditional mean of z t along the path u:
Andreasen et al. (2017) derive separate expressions for the evolution over time of the variances of controls. We take a di¤erent approach, which we …nd to be simpler, especially in dealing with thirdorder moments. We expand the set of objects we …nd a GIRF of from y t to Y t = 2 4 y t ( y t ) ( y t ) ( y t ) ( y t ) ( y t ) 3 5 , so that we can compute one GIRF for all the moments of interest in one pass. For example, vec(V ar( y t )) = E[( y t ) ( y t )] E[ y t ] E[ y t ], and the skewness of y t is similarly a function of E[( y t ) ( y t ) ( y t )]. Using the expression y t = A y ut;u t+1 ( t+1 )z t + B y u t+1 ( t+1 ) and expanding the Kronecker products in X t , we have matricesÃ 
where Z t = 2 4 z t z t z t z t z t z t 3 5 .
To calculate the law of motion for Z t , we expand the Kronecker products in the de…nition of Z t using the law of motion Z t+1 = A ut;u t+1 ( t+1 )z t + B u t+1 ( t+1 ) and arrive at the law of motion Z t+1 =Ã ut;u t+1 ( t+1 )Z t j + B u t+1 ( t+1 ) for matricesÃ ut;u t+1 ( t+1 ) andB u t+1 ( t+1 ).
For any Z 0 , the independence of t+1 and Z t implies for states and controls (noting that E [Ã ut;u 
Let Z 0 be the …xed point of the law of motion for E[Z t+1 Z 0 ; u], conditional on t < 0, in other words, conditional on no unrest at time t or t + 1.
From the elements of Z 0 , we can calculate the ergodic means, variances, covariances, skewnesses, and sundry third moments of all elements of z t conditional on no unrest. This is the starting point of our GIRF. For t = 1; 2; 3:::, use the laws of motion for X t and Z t to iterate forward, conditional on both the path u and the counterfactual path u, and use those paths to calculate the GIRF for X t :
This notation is very condensed. For example,B y u t+1 ( t+1 ) is a very large matrix, with very large polynomials containing terms with order as high as 9
t+1 . There are a large number of terms in every element of these matrices, even if expressed as Kronecker products; that is why we rely on the symbolic manipulation of Mathematica to expand these polynomials. Even after exploiting the very high degree of symmetry and redundant terms in Z t , there are over 20,000 unique elements in that vector. Mathematica can handle these calculations very quickly, calculating the GIRFs for both states and controls in under two minutes. 
